Joint Military Campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Posted: November 8th, 2023

Joint Military Campaign in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Student’s Name

Course

Date

Introduction

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the years of military action that followed constitute a wealthy case study for governments to draw lessons pertinent to the transformation of the United States military and allied action. It has become a norm in American foreign policy that the country will engage in military action in coalitions with other militaries. Under the presidency of Bill Clinton and George Bush, the government pursued military cooperation around the world for an increased capacity to fight. OIF outlines how the size of coalitions has changed since the Cold War era. The falling statue of former president Saddam Hussein is one of the many signals of a successful military operation. This paper argues that while there are many lessons to be learned from OIF, the military invasion confirms a new warfare theory. OIF was a highly successful joint military campaign that achieved most of its objectives and replaced America’s conventional use of firepower and brute strength with high technology and special forces.

Joint operation is a collective phrase for how the army conducts activities with allied forces, U.S. agencies across all levels, non-government bodies and international agencies. The military principle emphasizes the integration of particular service units of the armed forces into a single unified command[1]. In essence, combining arms is designed to scale up warfare to a national level, making the strategy an effective tool for force projection. The synergy that results from unification maximizes warfare capability[2]. For instance, due to its small size, Iraqi forces could not carry out multi-domain (land, sea, air, cyber and space) warfare against insurgents. It is only through joint operations that it could fight on all fronts. Improved capability outlines why practitioners of the doctrine must appreciate the significance of interagency processes, especially when it comes to intelligence gathering and sharing. Multi-domain warfare could be the next form of conflict in the near future.

The term ‘joint operations’ is logical and uncontroversial at the surface level. According to Finlan, Danielsson and Lundqvist, the concept has a specific origin, the armed forces of the west[3]. In the traditional sense, joint military operations referred to all three armed services branches working together to achieve a particular objective. Sea, land and air (including cyberspace) collaborate during national-level warfare. The bulk of the research on the contemporary understanding of joint operations begins with the 1993 Doctrine for Joint Operations[4]. The document was produced in the United States following its endorsement by the former Head of the Joint Chief of Staff, Sir Colin Powell. Unsurprisingly, the concept would become a practice norm for the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom and NATO. The United Kingdom would introduce the U.K. Joint Operations Doctrine JDP, while NATO implemented its Allied Joint Doctrine AJP[5]. From there, scholars in defence have contributed to the development of the concept.

Description and History of Joint Operations

Traditional military action only facilitated three types of joint operations. During the 1980s, the concept is illustrated through a scale between cooperation, interoperability and integration[6]. Cooperation is the most common and simplest form of joint operations. An example is the British-United States coalition in Operation Desert Storm[7]. Interoperability provides more potential for military effectiveness but requires the establishment of compatibility through technology and personnel training[8]. During the invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of Al-Qaeda, America taught, trained and equipped local Afghani forces to enhance their self-sufficiency[9]. Integration is the most difficult form of joint operations to establish but offers more potential benefits. The approach refers to a seamless configuration of militaries, transcending the conventional boundaries of warfare. There is no solid example of integrated joint operations, perhaps due to the need for political distinctiveness.

            There was a political need to document joint operations as a military doctrine following its effectiveness in the past. In 1991, President Bush announced the commencement of a U.S. led invasion of Kuwait[10]. Operation Desert Storm is famously known as one of the early provocations between the United States and Iraq, as the former invaded Kuwait to eject the latter. The norm is that, in most cases, the United States leads a coalition of countries characterized by democratic rule. There is evidence of this rule as early as post Second World War. In June 1950, President Truman ordered the interception of North Korean forces following their invasion of South Korea[11]. Truman perceived the war as a communist confrontation with the liberal world. In the same month, the United Nations passed a milestone revolution to back the United States. Operation Chromite remains one of the earliest evidence of joint operations, which included participation by the United Nations.

            . President Bush’s emphasis on joint campaigns stems from political pressure that emerged during the Reagan era. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a mandate by the government to increase army capacity due to growing tensions in South America, the Middle East and Pacific Asia[12]. The goal at the time was to use legislation to institutionalize joint military campaigns. The United States wish to employ its extensive operational and tactical experience to improve its allies’ capabilities[13]. In turn, the army would have improved responsive capabilities. For instance, training the Colombians would improve their ability to fight the war on drugs. The joint operations doctrine is not restricted to the armed forces alone. The Colombian example shows the army and intelligence agencies working with local law enforcement and Colombia’s army

Apart from political pressure, certain tactical failures encouraged the use of joint operations. The first debacle was the Mayaguez incident, where Cambodian forces captured an American merchant vessel[14]. In retaliation, the Americans launched a joint navy, air, and special forces operation at Koh Tang island. The joint forces found the Cambodians had already released the vessel, highlighting the need for improved intelligence and communication[15]. Another event was Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada (1983). Following a coup, there was an increased threat that the Caribbean island would promote Cuba’s Marxist orientations. When British and American forces arrived, they divided the island into two, conducting separate operations. The teams struggled because communication was poor, discouraging cooperation. A report from the Senate Armed Forces states that officers had to use commercial cellphones to report back or contact each other[16]. Operation Urgent Fury led to the enactment of the Goldwater Nichols Act (1986), which strengthened the call for joint capabilities[17].

Present Joint Campaign

            The transition from joint operations to interoperability has not been without challenges for unifying forces. For most operations, the problem is that member states have powerful individual armed services, strong cultures, and identities[18]. The shift to interoperability has been raising issues associated with leadership and independence. It can be argued that individual cultures and identities are the underlying basis for all these concerns[19]. An example is the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) policy. The approach to joint operations involves a permanent joint command[20]. However, CENTCOM is limited because only the command arrangement is truly interoperable. The problem with present joint campaigns is that they require political solutions for a technical defence problem.

            Goldwater-Nichols sets the golden standard for contemporary joint military campaigns. The legislation was enacted following operational-level lapses during the early 80s that led to massive public criticism of American military action in Vietnam[21]. Included in Goldwater-Nichols was the Defense Reorganization Act (1986)[22]. The law introduced a unified command plan for education, training, weapons systems acquisition, and professional development[23]. From the aforementioned three types of joint operations, the Defense Reorganization Act outlines the shift towards integration. Goldwater-Nichols has been highly successful in institutionalizing joint operations. The U.S. can be seen actively engaged in professional military education and field operations with allied armies. Integration, however, is most evident in the intelligent arms of the government[24]. Since the 2001 terrorist disaster, there has been increased unification and development of intelligence agencies among allied nations. The effectiveness of intelligence information sharing often determines the military capacity to undertake joint campaigns.

            The future focus for joint operations is the challenge of deploying armed forces in environments where it is controversial or contested to undertake military operations. With increased technological innovation, future operations might be done under the assumption that the United States will not lead[25]. In contested areas, the United States will not have superiority due to a lack of know-how. The estimate implies the country will have to develop inter-domain dependencies with allied armies during joint campaigns[26]. Other aspects of joint operations are equally likely to become more important. For instance, Carafano talks about establishing and improving military infrastructure, logistics, and supply chains[27]. Allied armies might have to integrate all these functions to become more agile and responsive. Technology balances out the playing field for everyone, making it more difficult for nations to push forward vital interests during joint military activities.

Operation Iraqi Freedom as a Successful Joint Operation

OIF came with its distinctive set of challenges, highlighting the hallmark attributes of a joint operation. Military personnel during the invasion adequately prepared for the occupation. An After Action Review informs that U.S. and British infantry divisions carried out training bridges before the initial push for Baghdad in April 2003[28]. Combined training was essential because of a shortage of civil affairs officers and general service units. The troops trained together on what was required of them, including restoring civil order, establishing an interim government, and maintaining a fair judicial system[29]. Cultural training was done to help military personnel avoid words or actions that might stir dissent in the Iraqi residents. The training was based on information provided by international intelligence communities[30]. The data-driven approach is equally reflective of a successful joint campaign. The information allows military planners to develop effective mechanisms for defence unification.

The success of OIF was signalled by the destruction of the country’s weapons of mass destruction. President Bush often cited the main reason for toppling the Iraqi regime was to search and destroy its weapons of mass destruction[31]. The collection of evidence regarding the weapons was a collective effort between different intelligent agencies across the globe. The U.S. military secured crucial documents from government ministries on illegal war programs. International intelligence agencies used the information to investigate and prosecute key Iraqi officials behind the illegal programs[32]. An example is the senior scientist Lieutenant Amir Saadi and General Jaffar Dhai. Intelligence collection was successfully joint, facilitating the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and the toppling down of terrorist networks[33]. Key Iraqi regime officials had formal ties with particular terrorist factions in the Middle East.

The Battle of Fallujah denotes the effectiveness of joint operations in high-intensity warfare in urban terrain. The city has become famous flowing Iraqi, British and American forces launching a legendary seize form insurgents. On November 16, the coalition met heavy resistance at a boundary called Isabel[34]. The enemy had set many booby-traps and mines, disabling the coalition from moving further. The only alternative for the ground troops was to collaborate with air controllers and a team of navy seals to terminate the attack. Records show the joint operation, called Hurricane Isabel’ composed of 35 airstrikes on 24 targets[35]. The joint operation was able to counter the insurgence in six hours after not moving for over a day. The number equates to nearly six airstrikes per hour from gunships and warplanes located far out. The effectiveness of the attack outlines the accuracy, timeliness and utility of coalition communication in OIF.

OIF had sufficient support from non-government organizations and humanitarian organizations to be a successful joint campaign. One objective of the occupation was to deliver humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people[36]. Years of economic sanctions had pillaged the country, mandating the inclusion of relief in the military campaign. The United Nations Security Council was behind the sanctions following Saddam Hussein’s refusal to terminate his mass destruction program[37]. With the U.S. led coalition able to topple Hussein’s regime, the U.N. security council could oversee the establishment of an interim government. The United States was not entirely responsible for post-war governance in Iraq, highlighting another successful joint activity. With the assistance of civilian authorities, the U.N security council ascertained the temporary governance structure meets the requirements of international security resolutions[38]. Due to joint operations, U.N sanctions came to an end. OIF introduced a different approach to joint operations, where a country-based military cooperated with international humanitarian bodies.

Operation Iraqi Freedom as an Unsuccessful Joint Operation

             The continuing controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction outlined a joint failure in allied intelligence. The case of weapons of mass destruction was a long-running assumption used to strain the intelligence community over its inability to detect the scope of Saddam’s intent[39]. The failure in intelligence is well caught in President Bush’s 2003 speech at the State of the Union[40]. The president claims allied intelligence sources had found out Saddam had attempted to purchase high-tensile aluminium tubes appropriate for nuclear weapons production. The United Nation’s 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) also made the inaccurate conclusion that Iraq had a robust set of biological weapons[41]. Until the end of the occupation and establishment of an interim government, no formal report cited the discovery of weapons of mass destruction or biological weapons in Iraq.

            The occupation of Iraq did not result in long-lasting peace, which is indicative of an operational failure on the part of the allied forces. The post-invasion phase of the invasion was the least well-planned segment of the occupation by the U.S. led coalition[42]. Past coalitions had led to enduring peace. Examples include the raid in Somalia (1993) and Lebanon (1983)[43]. The standard explanation for the minimal preparedness is a lapse in intelligence gathering. The Secretary of Defense and the military had to work with several foreign policy specialists to plan for Iraq’s executive branches. Militaries are not the only bodies on joint campaigns influencing policy and strategies[44]. Other government and non-governmental organizations have to be included to handle civil affairs. OIF denotes poor collaborative planning for post-invasion. The integration of external bodies in military actions remains a significant impediment to the effective adoption of joint campaigns.

            There are several instances of the coalition forces underestimating the enemy due to poor information gathering and analysis. In the battle of Majar-al-Kabir, the coalition forces did not anticipate much rebellion, a mistake on their part[45]. According to a report by Lieutenant Callum Moses, the Platoon Commander of the 1st Military Battalion, the small town was regarded as one of the least threatening locations in Iraq[46]. The inaccurate estimate highlights the coalition’s benign interactions with the locals. It is worth noting that residents had engaged in hypervigilance and created opportunities for guerilla warfare. As aforementioned, one failure in OIF was the delay or gap in capacity building. The U.S. led coalition did little to integrate locals in training or education, which did not help their public perception[47]. Because OIF did not accurately estimate the number of armed men in the small town, there was insufficient ammunition to counter the insurgency. Majar-al-Kabir is an example of a tactical failure in the joint operation.

From a neutral perspective, structural and policy choices in the joint campaign were responsible for the Iraqi failure. The coalition was met by a divided society ravaged by years of civil wars and sanctions. The differences in political context between the western allied forces and Iraq made successful policy implementation quite difficult[48]. The political structures reduced available policy options for the coalition, made worse by the United States making several bad choices. Rojas Guevara claims that the Iraq coalition failed to establish a political settlement before the occupation, largely contributing to its failure[49]. Another point of policy failure is the increasing domestic backlash over the occupation. The United States and Britain frequently faced public protests and criticism over their invasion of Iraq. The negative public sentiment influenced certain humanitarian agencies from not being very present in the war[50]. The allied forces should have considered the cultural and political identities of the Iraqi populace before commencing their occupation.

Implications and Lessons

The occupation phase of OIF outlined the limitations of joint military force as a driver of foreign policy. The outcome of the operation adds to military research in the 90s, which indicated air power alone is insufficient for decisive occupation[51]. The joint approach highlights that ground invasion is equally ineffective. Joint military operations are necessary but unsustainable and unsuitable as tools for foreign policy[52]. Instead, the determination of suitable foreign policy should be based on intensive intelligence surveillance and cultural research. Information is the key to allied forces closely watching enemies and adopting new strategies.

Joint operations have to be guided by comprehensive, timely and accurate intelligence. Operation Iraqi freedom had numerous intelligence lapses, including focusing on the wrong targets[53]. The U.S. fought Islamic extremists, Al-Qaeda, without researching the republic’s strategic role in the Middle East and global terrorism. Joint operations created an administrative void after toppling Saddam that enabled the emergence of ISIS and an expansion of Iranian influence[54]. The developments increased instability in Syria and, ultimately, the greater MENA region.

Joint operations should not focus on their collective power without considering the development of local forces. The U.S. led coalition failed to provide focused security assistance in Iraq[55]. The U.S. depended mostly on its large army and contributions from allied armies but was too slow in training and equipping Iraq’s military forces. The coalition also did not provide proper leadership training for post-self-governance[56]. As highlighted, depending heavily on ground troops is ineffective for sustained occupation. A slow build of domestic forces created room for the emergence of extremist groups.

Conclusion

            This essay has shown that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a noteworthy development in joint military operations. The U.S. led coalition was decisive and effective in producing a quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces. However, poor planning resulted in ineffective postwar operations. The Iraqi invasion institutionalizes interoperability and integration in joint military operations. Interoperability in the sense that U.S. forces collaborated, making shared plans with the United Nations and other allied forces to improve its military capabilities. Integration is seen during the post-war phase, as local Iraqi forces are trained and equipped by the U.S. led coalition to facilitate a sustainable political transition. While the shift in the type of joint operations is gradually becoming evident, there is still cause to argue that full integration will never occur. As long as individual states and militaries want to maintain their culture, identity and safety, full integration is not feasible.

            It remains unclear whether jointness was the key to the U.S. led coalition defeating Saddam Hussein. Several factors could have contributed more, such as the immense international support, limited military objectives and superior technology. It is more logical to conclude that joint operations were a positive contributor but not the decisive factor in OIF. Therefore, the different points of failure and victory during the invasion require more attention and analysis to improve the utility of joint campaigns. It is likely that the new approach to warfare will become more common, necessitating timely reviews and refinement. The war on terror is a global problem, which is why collaborative responses are bound to become popular.

            The Iraqi occupation forever changed America’s approach to joint operations. The nation had failed to prepare or plan for personnel training and inter-agency execution. Future joint operations will stem from a comprehensive understanding of the enemy. In addition, there will be a need to include local forces for post-war peace and development. The changing nature of joint operations creates concerns over how integration will occur in the dynamic and ever-expanding cyberspace. The security of information and defence systems will be a priority research area for allied forces, as information is the single most important resource during warfare. Joint operations must also now consider the complexity and dynamicity of future warfare. Coalitions will have to fight in wars where each domain needs to be secured. Lessons from the past should teach that joint warfare is supposed to enhance the projection of force without its application. The objective is to use enhanced information gathering and tactical planning to reduce human and material costs.

Bibliography

Ballard, John. Operation Chromite Counter Attack at Inchon. Defense Technical Information Center, 2001.

Ben Barry, Blood. Metal and Dust: How Victory Turned to Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2020)

Braganca, Eric. The Evolution of Special Operations Joint Forces. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2005.

Bulmer, S. and Jackson, D. You Do Not Live My Skin: Embodiment, Voice and the Veteran. Critical Military Studies, vol. 2, (2016): 25-40.

Byman, Daniel. An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far? Security Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, (2008): 599-643).

Carafano, James. America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare. The Heritage Foundation, (2011): 23-32.

Clark, James. Unbelievable Stories from the Second Battle of Fallujah. Task and Purpose, 8 November 2021, https://taskandpurpose.com/history/unbelievable-stories-from-second-battle-of-fallujah/

Cloppa, Thomas. Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Communication Analysis and Assessment. Media, War and Conflict, vol. 2, no. 1, (2009): 25-45.

Cordesman, Anthony. Correcting America’s Grand Strategic Failures in Iraq. CSIS Journal, 1 April 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/correcting-americas-grand-strategic-failures-iraq

Cordesman, Anthony. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons. CSIS Journal, (2003): 149-165.

Crosbie, Thomas. Getting the Joint Functions Right. Joint Doctrine Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 3, (2019): 96-99.

David C. Hendrickson & Robert W. Tucker, ‘Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War’, Survival, vol. 47, no.2, (2005).

Finlan, Alastair, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defence Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021). https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1932476

Flibbert, Andrew. The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 128, no. 1, (2013): 67-95.

Garden, Timothy. Iraq: The Military Campaign. International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4 (2003): 701-718.

Geraint Hughes, ‘British Generals in Blair’s Wars: A Review Article’, The Round Table, vol. 102, no.6 (2013)

Hanlon, Michael. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of U.S. Military. Brookings, 19 June 2003. https://www.brookings.edu/research/operation-iraqi-freedom-and-the-future-of-the-u-s-military/

Hanlon, Michaels. Iraq Without a Plan. Brookings, 1 January 2005, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/

Hover, Matthew. The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned. International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, no. 885, (2012): 338-346.

Jeanne Godfroy & Liam Collins, ‘Iraq, 2003-2011: succeeding to fail’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30/1 (2019)

Justin Kelly & Michael Brennan, ‘The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 56/1 (2010)

Lacquement, Richard. The Gulf War 30 Years Later: Successes, Failures and Blind Spots. War on the Rocks, 9 September 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-gulf-war-30-years-later-successes-failures-and-blind-spots/

Mark Moyar, ‘The era of American hegemony, 1989-2005’, in Roger Chickering, Denis Showalter & Hans van der Ven (ed.), The Cambridge History of War. Volume IV: War and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012)

Marquis, Christopher and Ross Kinkead. The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War; A 25 Year Retrospective. Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 85, (2017): 76-84.

Molan, Jim. Do You Need to Decisively Win the Information War? Managing Information on Operations in Iraq. Security Challenges Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, (2009): 37-52.

Noonan, Michael. The Military Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1 May 2013, https://www.fpri.org/article/2003/05/the-military-lessons-of-operation-iraqi-freedom/

Perry, Walter and Laurinda Rohn. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Decisive War, Elusive Peace. Rand Organization, 2013.

Rojas-Guevara, Pedro. Joint Operations: Iraqi Freedom Operation and its Comparison with the Joint Military Strategy in Colombia. Papel Politico, vol. 20, no. 2, (2015): 613-623.

Smith, Jeffrey. U.S. Military Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Atlantic, 11 June 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/us-military-admits-major-mistakes-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/258339/

Spring, Baker. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Objectives Met. The Heritage Foundation, 18 April 2003, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/operation-iraqi-freedom-military-objectives-met

Stephen Biddle. ‘Speed kills? Reassessing the role of speed, precision, and situation awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 30, no.1, (2007). 

Taylor, Alan. Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War. The Atlantic, 14 January 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/

Tracey, Richard. Trapped by a Mindset: The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure. Chronicles Online Journal, (2007). http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html

Weltsman, Patricia. With a Little Help from our Friends? The Costs of Coalition Warfare. Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, 2009. https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-gulf-war-30-years-later-successes-failures-and-blind-spots/

Williamson Murray & Robert Scales, The Iraq War: A Military History. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2003).


[1] Alastair Finlan, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defense Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021).

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Alan Taylor. Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War. The Atlantic, 14 January 2016, (https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/)

[8] Alastair Finlan, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defense Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021).

[9] Michael Hanlon. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of U.S. Military. Brookings, 19 June 2003. https://www.brookings.edu/research/operation-iraqi-freedom-and-the-future-of-the-u-s-military/

[10]Alan Taylor. Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War. The Atlantic, 14 January 2016, (https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/)

[11]Ballard, John. Operation Chromite Counter Attack at Inchon. (Defense Technical Information Center, 2001), 2.

[12] Alan Taylor. Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War. The Atlantic, 14 January 2016, (https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/)

[13] Id.

[14] Alastair Finlan, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defense Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021).

[15] Ballard, John. Operation Chromite Counter Attack at Inchon. (Defense Technical Information Center, 2001), 2.

[16] Alastair Finlan, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defense Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021).

[17] Goldwater Nichols Act (1986)

[18] Michael Hanlon. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of U.S. Military. Brookings, 19 June 2003. (https://www.brookings.edu/research/operation-iraqi-freedom-and-the-future-of-the-u-s-military/ )

[19] S. Bulmer and Jackson, D. You Do Not Live My Skin: Embodiment, Voice and the Veteran. Critical Military Studies, vol. 2, (2016): 28.

[20] Alastair Finlan, Anna Danielsson and Stefan Lundqvist. Critically Engaging the Concept of Joint Operations: Origins, Reflexivity and the Case of Sweden. Defense Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, (2021).

[21] Carafano, James. America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare. The Heritage Foundation, (2011): 26.

[22] Defense Reorganization Act (1986).

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Alan Taylor. Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War. The Atlantic, 14 January 2016, (https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/01/operation-desert-storm-25-years-since-the-first-gulf-war/424191/)

[26] Id.

[27] Carafano, James. America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare. The Heritage Foundation, (2011): 26.

[28] Jim Molan. Do You Need to Decisively Win the Information War? Managing Information on Operations in Iraq. Security Challenges Journal, vol. 5, no. 1, (2009): 39.

[29] Id, 40.

[30] Timothy Garden. Iraq: The Military Campaign. International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4 (2003): 711.

[31] Patricia Weltsman. With a Little Help from our Friends? The Costs of Coalition Warfare. Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, 2009. (https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-gulf-war-30-years-later-successes-failures-and-blind-spots/)

[32] Christopher Marquis and Ross Kinkead. The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War; A 25 Year Retrospective. Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 85, (2017): 79.

[33] Id.

[34] Clark, James. Unbelievable Stories from the Second Battle of Fallujah. Task and Purpose, 8 November 2021

[35] Id.

[36] Matthew Hover. The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned. International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, no. 885, (2012): 338.

[37] Thomas Crosbie. Getting the Joint Functions Right. Joint Doctrine Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 3, (2019): 97.

[38] Matthew Hover. The Occupation of Iraq: A Military Perspective on Lessons Learned. International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 94, no. 885, (2012): 345.

[39] Walter Perry and Laurinda Rohn. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Decisive War, Elusive Peace. (Rand Organization, 2013); 3.

[40] Richard Tracey. Trapped by a Mindset: The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure. Chronicles Online Journal, (2007). http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html

[41] Id.

[42] Michaels Hanlon. Iraq Without a Plan. Brookings, 1 January 2005, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/

[43] Jeanne Godfroy & Liam Collins, ‘Iraq, 2003-2011: succeeding to fail’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30/1 (2019).

[44] Andrew Flibbert. The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 128, no. 1, (2013): 69.

[45] Carafano, James. America’s Joint Force and the Domains of Warfare. The Heritage Foundation, (2011): 26.

[46] Id.

[47] Daniel Byman. An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far? Security Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, (2008): 602. 

[48] Id 

[49] Pedro Rojas-Guevara. Joint Operations: Iraqi Freedom Operation and its Comparison with the Joint Military Strategy in Colombia. Papel Politico, vol. 20, no. 2, (2015): 615.

[50] Daniel Byman. An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far? Security Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, (2008): 602. 

[51]Anthony Cordesman. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons. CSIS Journal, (2003): 152.

[52] Id.

[53] Cordesman, Anthony. Correcting America’s Grand Strategic Failures in Iraq. CSIS Journal, 1 April 2021, (https://www.csis.org/analysis/correcting-americas-grand-strategic-failures-iraq)

[54] Stephen Biddle. ‘Speed kills? Reassessing the role of speed, precision, and situation awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 30, no.1, (2007).   

[55] Richard Tracey. Trapped by a Mindset: The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure. Chronicles Online Journal, (2007). http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/tracey.html

[56]Id.

Expert paper writers are just a few clicks away

Place an order in 3 easy steps. Takes less than 5 mins.

Calculate the price of your order

You will get a personal manager and a discount.
We'll send you the first draft for approval by at
Total price:
$0.00